Art. 1. Prohibited collusion
(1) Without prejudice to paragraph 3, all agreements and concerted practices between undertakings and all decisions by associations of undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the Hellenic Republic shall be prohibited, and in particular those which:
a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
b) limit or control production, distribution, technical development or investment;
c) share markets or sources of supply;
d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent trading transactions, especially the unjustified refusal to sell, buy or otherwise trade, thereby hindering the functioning of competition;
e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance, by the other parties, of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial use, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
(2) Any agreements and decisions by associations of undertakings which come under paragraph 1 and to which paragraph 3 does not apply shall be automatically void.
(3) Agreements, decisions and concerted practices which come under paragraph 1 shall not be prohibited, provided that they cumulatively satisfy the following preconditions:
a) they contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting of technical or economic progress;
b) at the same time, they allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit;
c) they do not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives and
d) they do not afford the possibility of eliminating competition or eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the relevant market.
(4) EU Regulations on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (block exemption Regulations)shall apply mutatis mutandis to the implementation of paragraph 3, to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which are not likely to affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the TFEU.
Art. 2. Abusive exploitation of a dominant position
(1) It is prohibited for one or more undertakings to abuse their dominant position within the national market or in a part of it.
(2) Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
b) limiting production, distribution or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent trading transactions with other trading parties, especially the unjustified refusal to sell, buy or otherwise trade, thereby placing certain undertakings at a competitive disadvantage;
d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance, by the other parties, of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial practice, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Art. 3.
(1) Agreements, decisions and concerted practices which come under Article 1(1) and do not satisfy the conditions of Article 1(3) shall be prohibited, without the need for a prior decision to that effect.
(2) Agreements, decisions and concerted practices which come under Article 1(1) and satisfy the conditions of Article 1(3) shall not be prohibited, without the need for a prior decision to that effect.
(3) Abuse of a dominant position in accordance with Article 2 shall be prohibited, without the need for a prior decision to that effect.
Art. 4. Burden of proof
Each party shall bear the burden of proof of their claims during proceedings before the Competition Commission for the purposes of Articles 1 and 2.
Art. 25. Powers of the Commission concerning infringements
(1) If the Competition Commission, following a relevant investigation carried out either ex officio or following a complaint, finds that Articles 1, 2 and 11 of this Law or Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union have been infringed, it may decide, either alternatively or cumulatively, to:
a) address recommendations in the event of infringement of Articles 1 and 2 of this Law or Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
b) require the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to bring the infringement to an end and refrain from it in future;
c) impose behavioural or structural remedies, which must be necessary and appropriate for cessation of the infringement and proportionate to its nature and gravity. Structural remedies shall be allowed only where no equally effective behavioural remedies exist or where any equally effective behavioural remedies are liable to be more onerous than structural remedies;
d) impose a fine, pursuant to paragraph 1 of article 25B, to undertakings or associations of undertakings that committed an infringement intentionally or negligently;
e) threaten with a fine, pursuant to paragraph 1) or 2 of article 25b or both, where the infringement is continued or repeated;
f) impose a fine according to par. 1 of article 25B or a financial sanction according to par. 2 of the same article or both, when, by its decision, the continuation or repetition of the violation or the failure by the undertakings or associations of undertakings to fulfil a commitment undertaken by them is confirmed, which has been made compulsory by a decision pursuant to Article 25C, or the non-observance of imposed behavioral or structural measures;
g) impose a fine according to par. 1 of article 25B or a financial sanction according to par. 2 of the same article or both, to undertakings or associations of undertakings, in case of non-compliance with a decision ordering interim measures pursuant to article 25D (h) find that the infringement has been committed in the past.
(2) [Repealed by Article 19 of Law 4886/2022 with effect from 24/1/2022]
(3) [Repealed by Article 19 of Law 4886/2022 with effect from 24/1/2022]
(4) [Repealed by Article 19 of Law 4886/2022 with effect from 24/1/2022]
(5) [Repealed by Article 19 of Law 4886/2022 with effect from 24/1/2022]
(6) [Repealed by Article 19 of Law 4886/2022 with effect from 24/1/2022]
(7) The undertakings or associations of undertakings are required, within thirty (30) days from the notification of the decision by which the infringement is established or the probability of the infringement and its termination is ordered, to inform the President of the Competition Commission about the actions taken or to be taken to bring an end to the infringement. The same obligation is borne by undertakings or associations of undertakings, when it comes to compliance with a court decision issued following an appeal against a decision of the Competition Commission.
(8) [Repealed by Article 19 of Law 4886/2022 with effect from 24/1/2022]
(9) If the Competition Commission finds a violation of Article 1A, it may, by its decision, impose the measures provided for in indents a) to up to g) of paragraph 1 and Article 25.
Art. 25Β. Fines
(1) The fine of indents d, e, f and g of par. 1 of article 25 must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and can reach up to ten percent (10%) of the total world turnover of the company in the year preceding the issuance of the decision. In case of a group of companies, for the calculation of the fine, the total global turnover of the group shall be taken into account. In determining the amount of the fine, the gravity, the duration, the geographic scope of the infringement, the duration and the type of participation in the infringement of the specific undertaking shall be taken into account. If it is possible to calculate the amount of the company's financial benefit from the infringement, the amount of the fine imposed may not be less than that, even if it exceeds the percentage set out in the first subparagraph. For the purpose of imposing the fine, the concept of enterprise covers the parent companies, within a single economic entity, the partial and total universal successors in case of corporate transformations and the acquirers of the business after the occurrence of the infringement, if the infringer is unable to pay the fine or other fine imposed at the time of their imposition.
(2) The Competition Commission may, by its decision, impose financial penalties per day of non-compliance, which shall be determined in proportion to the average daily total global turnover of the undertaking or association of undertakings prior to the issuance of the decision, capped at three percent (3%) of this turnover and are calculated from the date set by the Commission decision.
(3) The Competition Commission, when determining the amount of the fine, shall take into account as a mitigating circumstance any compensation paid to the parties injured by the anti-competitive practice in question, or to a significant number of them, in the context of a consensual settlement. If the consensual settlement is pending, the Competition Commission may suspend the issuance of the decision on the imposition of the fine for a period not exceeding three (3) months.
(4) Where the infringement committed by the association is related to the activities of its members, the fine may be up to ten percent (10%) of the total global turnover of its members who were active in the market in which the infringement occurred in the year preceding the issuance of the decision. If a fine is imposed on an association of companies, taking into account the total turnover of its members, and the association is not solvent, the association is obliged to request contributions from its members in order to cover the amount of the fine. If the contributions are not paid within the set time limit, the Competition Commission may demand payment of the fine directly from each of the undertakings whose representatives belonged to the association’s decision-making bodies. After the Commission has required payment under the previous subparagraph, where necessary to ensure full payment of the fine, the Commission may require payment of the balance by any of the members of the association which were active on the market on which the infringement occurred. The Competition Commission shall not require payment under the preceding subparagraphs from companies which prove that they did not comply with the association's illegal decision because they either did not realise its existence or actively distanced themselves from it before the Competition Commission began investigating the case. The financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of its total global turnover in the preceding financial year.
(5) The responsibility for compliance with Articles 1, 1A, 2, 5 to 10 and paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 11 hereof, as well as Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union lies with the managers of civil and commercial companies and joint ventures and all the general partners, especially in public limited companies the members of the board of directors and the persons responsible for the implementation of the relevant decisions and in listed public limited companies, the executive members of the board of directors, while, in associations of undertakings, their supreme governing body. Designation of any other person as responsible for the violation of competition rules is prohibited. Any responsibility for decisions of the collective bodies of the undertaking or the association of undertakings, taken by a majority, lies solely with those who voted in favor thereof. The above natural persons are liable with their personal property in full with the relevant legal entity, for the payment of the amount of the fine. The Competition Commission may impose on the above natural persons, after their prior hearing, a separate fine from two hundred thousand (200,000) to two million (2,000,000) euros, where it is shown that they have been engaged in preparatory actions, in the organisation of or in the illegal business behavior. For the calculation of the fine, special account shall be taken of their position in the undertaking and the extent of their participation in the unlawful act.
Art. 44. Criminal sanctions and other administrative consequences.
(1) Any person who executes an agreement, takes a decision or applies a concerted practice in breach of Article 1 or Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall be punished by a fine between EUR fifteen thousand (15,000) and one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000). Any person who, in the capacity of Article 25B par. 5, acts in breach of Articles 5 to 10 or fails to apply decisions issued in accordance with Article 11(5) and (6) shall be subject to the same punishment. If the act referred to in the first sentence pertains to undertakings which are in actual or potential competition with each other, a term of imprisonment of at least two (2) years and a fine of between EUR one hundred thousand (100,000) and one million (1,000,000) shall be paid.
(2) Any person who abuses a dominant market position in breach of Article 2 of the present law or Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall be punished by a fine of between EUR thirty thousand (30,000) and three hundred thousand (300,000).
(3Α) Where:
a) an application for leniency is approved, pursuant to article 29B providing for total immunity from fine or reduction of fine and full payment thereof, or
b) an application for settlement is approved, pursuant to article 29A providing for full payment of the fine, a waiver from any criminal liability for the former and current directors, executives and other staff members as well as any other responsible person of par. 5 of article 25B of the offense of the first and third sentence of paragraph 1,2 and the crimes that are ideologically linked to them, provided that the persons in question have actively cooperated with the Competition Commission and are actively cooperating with the public prosecutor, as well as that the application for entry in a leniency program or dispute settlement procedure was submitted before they were duly informed of the criminal prosecution against them, or the possibility of criminal prosecution. The provision of facilitatory partial payment of the fine facilitates criminal prosecution for as long as the arrangement is in force and the debtor is consistent with its terms. During the period of suspension, the limitation of the offenses shall be suspended without applying the time limitations referred to in Article 113(2) (a) of the Penal Code. Following the admission to the program of article 29(C), which gave effect to the imposition of a reduced fine, where the fine is not paid in full, it shall constitute a mitigating circumstance in itself for the offences of paragraphs 1 and 2 and a reduced sanction shall be imposed pursuant to article 83 of the Penal Code.
(3B) Where:
a) an application for leniency is approved, pursuant to article 29(B) providing for total immunity from fine or reduction of fine and full payment thereof, or
b) an application for settlement is approved, pursuant to article 29A providing for full payment of the fine, the former and current directors, executives and other staff members, as well as any other responsible person of par. 5 of article 25B shall be relieved from any administrative penalty and fines imposed in non- criminal judicial proceedings, provided that said persons cooperated actively with the Competition Commission during the investigation of the infringement and that the application for leniency program or for settlement procedure was submitted before they were duly informed of the criminal prosecution against them.
(3C) Where:
a) an application for leniency is approved, pursuant to article 29(B) providing for total immunity from fine or reduction of fine and full payment thereof, or
b) an application for settlement is approved, pursuant to article 29A providing for full payment of the fine, undertaking concerned shall be relieved from any administrative penalty, except those set out in article 25 and in par. 1, 2 and 5 of article 25B. In the above cases, the finding of the relevant infringement shall not establish grounds for exclusion of the undertaking from public procurement procedures or concessions, except the repetitive breach provided for in article 1 or article 101 TFEU. A repetitive breach shall mean the issuing of a relevant declaratory decision within six (6) years from the earlier issuing of another declaratory decision. The present provision shall apply to the event of facilitated partial fine payment and for as long the arrangement is in force and the debtor is consistent with its terms. The present provision shall also apply where there is a declaratory decision on the infringement of article 1 or article 101 TFEU and a three-year period from its issuing has not yet elapsed.
(4) Without prejudice to par. 3A, persons who commit or are involved in an act in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall go unpunished if they report it of their own volition along with evidence, prior of being examined in connection with their act, to the Public Prosecutor, the Competition Commission or any other competent authority. In any event, the material contribution of the above persons to the discovery of involvement in such practices, by adducing evidence to the authorities, is deemed to be a mitigating circumstance in accordance with Article 84 of the Penal Code and a reduced fine is imposed in accordance with Article 83 of the Penal Code.
(5) If the act referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 is being investigated in any manner by the Competition Commission or any other competent authority, the Public Prosecutor shall suspend any further action following the preliminary investigation, pending a decision by the Competition Commission, with the assent of the prosecutor to the Courts of Appeal, in which case the time limit in par. 2 of Article 113(3)(a) of the Penal Code shall not apply. The case is not brought before the court before the final decision on the appeal against the decision of the Competition Commission, which established the infringement for the performance of which the accused is involved, or the non-expiration of the relevant deadline for its exercise. The Competition Commission has the obligation to inform the public prosecutor, in accordance with the application of the definitions in Article 43.
(6) Any person affected by infringements of paragraphs 1 and 2 may appear as civil plaintiff at trials of such acts.
(7) A punishment of at least six (6)-month imprisonment is imposed on:
a) whoever obstructs or hampers, in any manner, investigations carried out under the provisions of the present Law by the competent bodies under Article 39, in particular by posing impediments or concealing evidence.
b) whoever refuses or prevents provision of information under Article 38.
c) anyone who knowingly provides with false information or conceals evidence, in breach of Articles 38 and 39.
d) whoever refuses, after having been duly summoned by an HCC's official designated under par. 1, 2 & 3 of Article 39, or other body competent for the investigation, to make a sworn or unsworn statement before it, according to the provisions of subparagraph (c) of par. 1 of Article 39, as well as anyone who, during his statement, knowingly provides false information or denies or conceals any facts.
(7Α) Any person who infringes the secrecy of the meetings of the Competition Commission shall be punished with a fine of between EUR ten thousand (10.000) and twenty thousand (20.000).
(8) When the European Commission or the competition authority of Member State of the European Union has dealt with a case involving several jurisdictions, including the Greek authorities and courts, and has granted the favor of leniency to an undertaking , the Competition Commission shall, at its discretion, ensure the exchange of contacts and the exchange of information between the European Commission or the competition authority of a Member State of the European Union in charge of the case and itself, the Public Prosecutor and any other competent Greek authority, in order to apply par. 3A and 3B, provided that the required conditions are met. To this end, the Competition Commission may communicate to the Public Prosecutor or any other competent Greek authority the information, data and documents received from the European Commission or the Competition Authority of a Member State of the European Union in charge of the case, without prejudice to Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003.
(9) What is provided in par. 1 to 8, does not affect the right of victims who have suffered damage from infringement of competition law to claim full compensation for such damage, in accordance with provisions of L. 4529/2018 (A’ 56).
