Art. 1. Prohibited collusion
(1) Without prejudice to paragraph 3, all agreements and concerted practices between undertakings and all decisions by associations of undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the Hellenic Republic shall be prohibited, and in particular those which:
a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
b) limit or control production, distribution, technical development or investment;
c) share markets or sources of supply;
d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent trading transactions, especially the unjustified refusal to sell, buy or otherwise trade, thereby hindering the functioning of competition;
e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance, by the other parties, of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial use, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
(2) Any agreements and decisions by associations of undertakings which come under paragraph 1 and to which paragraph 3 does not apply shall be automatically void.
(3) Agreements, decisions and concerted practices which come under paragraph 1 shall not be prohibited, provided that they cumulatively satisfy the following preconditions:
a) they contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting of technical or economic progress;
b) at the same time, they allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit;
c) they do not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives and
d) they do not afford the possibility of eliminating competition or eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the relevant market.
(4) EU Regulations on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (block exemption Regulations)shall apply mutatis mutandis to the implementation of paragraph 3, to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which are not likely to affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the TFEU.
Art. 2. Abusive exploitation of a dominant position
(1) It is prohibited for one or more undertakings to abuse their dominant position within the national market or in a part of it.
(2) Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
b) limiting production, distribution or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent trading transactions with other trading parties, especially the unjustified refusal to sell, buy or otherwise trade, thereby placing certain undertakings at a competitive disadvantage;
d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance, by the other parties, of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial practice, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Art. 3.
(1) Agreements, decisions and concerted practices which come under Article 1(1) and do not satisfy the conditions of Article 1(3) shall be prohibited, without the need for a prior decision to that effect.
(2) Agreements, decisions and concerted practices which come under Article 1(1) and satisfy the conditions of Article 1(3) shall not be prohibited, without the need for a prior decision to that effect.
(3) Abuse of a dominant position in accordance with Article 2 shall be prohibited, without the need for a prior decision to that effect.
Art. 4. Burden of proof
Each party shall bear the burden of proof of their claims during proceedings before the Competition Commission for the purposes of Articles 1 and 2.
Art. 25. Powers of the Commission concerning infringements
(1) If the Competition Commission, following a relevant investigation carried out either ex officio or following a complaint or a request by the Minister of Economy, Competitiveness and Shipping, finds that Articles 1, 2 and 11 of this Law or Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union have been infringed, it may decide, either alternatively or cumulatively, to:
a) address recommendations in the event of infringement of Articles 1 and 2 of this Law or Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
b) require the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to bring the infringement to an end and refrain from it in the future,
c) impose behavioural or structural remedies, which must be necessary and appropriate for cessation of the infringement and proportionate to its nature and gravity. Structural remedies shall be allowed only where no equally effective behavioural remedies exist or where any equally effective behavioural remedies are liable to be more burdensome than structural remedies,
d) impose a fine, pursuant to paragraph 2 a), to undertakings or associations of undertakings that commit an infringement or fail to fulfil a commitment made by them and that has been made binding by a decision of the Competition Commission, pursuant to paragraph 6.
e) threaten a fine, pursuant to paragraph 2 a) or 2 b) or both, where the infringement is continued or repeated;
f) impose the threatened fine pursuant to paragraph 2 a) or 2 b) or both where, it is confirmed, by its decision, that the infringement is continued or repeated or that the concerned undertakings or associations of undertakings fail to fulfil a commitment made by them and has been made binding by a decision pursuant to paragraph 6.
(2a) The fine threatened or imposed under paragraph 1 d), e) and f) may be up to ten percent (10%) of the total turnover of the undertaking for the financial year in which the infringement ceased or, if it continues until issuing of the decision, the year preceding the issuing of the decision. In the case of a group of companies, calculation of the fine shall take account of the total turnover of the group. In determining the level of the fine, account must be taken of the gravity, duration and geographical scope of the infringement, the duration and nature of participation in the infringement by the undertaking concerned, and also its economic benefit derived therefrom. Where it is possible to calculate the level of economic benefit to the undertaking from the infringement, the fine shall be no less than that, even if it exceeds the percentage stated in the first subparagraph hereof.
b) The fine provided for in paragraph 1(e) and (f) shall be capped at ten thousand (10,000) Euros for each day of delay in complying with the decision and from the date determined by the decision.
c) Liable for compliance with Articles 1, 2, 5 to 10 and 11 5) and 6) of this Law and also Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall, in the case of individual undertakings, be the owners, in the case of civil and commercial companies and joint ventures, their managers and all thegeneral partners, and in the specific case of public limited companies, the members of the board of directors and those persons responsible for implementing the relevant decisions. Designating another person as liable for the infringement of competition rules is prohibited and invalid. Regarding decisions of collective bodies of the undertaking taken by majority, only those voting in favour shall be liable. The above natural persons shall be liable, by means of their personal assets, jointly and severally with the relevant legal staff, for payment of the sum. The Competition Commission may also impose on the above natural persons, following their hearing, a separate fine from two hundred thousand (200,000) Euros to two million (2,000,000) Euros where they demonstrably participated in preparatory acts, the organisation or commission of the unlawful behaviour of the undertaking. In determining the fine, particular account shall be taken of their position in the undertaking and the extent of their participation in the unlawful conduct.
3) When the infringement committed by an association of undertakings is linked to the activities of its members, the fine imposed or threatened may be up to ten percent (10%) of the total turnover of its members in the financial year in which the infringement ceased or, if it continues until the issuing of the decision, the year preceding the issuing of the decision. Where a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings, taking account of the total turnover of its members, and the association is not solvent, the association shall be required to call for contributions from its members to cover the amount of the fine. Where such contributions have not been made within the time-limit set by the Competition Commission, the Competition Commission may require payment of the fine directly from each of the undertakings whose representatives were members of the decision-making bodies concerned of the association. After the Competition Commission has required payment in accordance with the preceding subparagraph, it may, where necessary to ensure full payment of the fine, require payment of the balance by any of the members of the association that were active in the market in which the infringement occurred. However, the Competition Commission shall not require payment based on the preceding subparagraphs from undertakings that show that they have not been aware of the existence of the infringing decision of the association or either they have not implemented it or have actively distanced themselves from it before the Competition Commission started investigating the case. The financial liability of each undertaking in respect of payment of the fine shall not exceed 10% of total turnover in the current financial year or the financial year preceding the infringement.
4) The Competition Commission may, by its decision, impose a fine on undertakings or associations of undertakings if they fail to comply with its earlier decision. The fine imposed under the preceding subparagraph may be up to ten percent (10%) of the total turnover of the undertaking in the current financial year or the financial year preceding the infringement.
5) The Competition Commission shall be exclusively competent for taking precautionary measures, on its own initiative or following a request by the Minister of Economy, Competitiveness and Shipping, where an infringement of Articles 1, 2 and 11 of this Law or Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is suspected and there is an urgent need to prevent an imminent risk of harm to the public interest.
The Competition Commission may threaten a fine of up to EUR ten thousand (10,000) for each day of failure to comply with its decision and may impose this fine by means of its decision confirming the failure to comply. In determining the level of the fine, account must be taken of the economic benefit to the undertaking from the infringement, and also of the effect of the failure to comply with the decision on the relevant market.
The Competition Commission shall be required to take a decision no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the request by the Minister of Economy, Competitiveness and Shipping, after first hearing the parties concerned.
This decision shall be subject to appeal before the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal. The provisions of Article 30(2), (3) and (4) shall apply by analogy. The provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the jurisdiction of the civil courts with regard to the adoption of interim measures to safeguard individual interests.
6) If the Competition Commission considers, during relevant investigation carried out either on its own initiative or following a request by the Minister of Economy, Competitiveness and Shipping or a complaint, that there is a likelihood of infringement of Articles 1 and 2 of this Law or Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, it may, by its decision, accept commitments on the part of the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to cease the infringement considered likely and may make such commitments binding for the undertakings or associations of undertakings. The Commission’s decision may be issued for a specified period, where it is considered likely that there are no grounds for its further action. The Commission may, following a request submitted by any party concerned or on its own initiative, reopen the proceedings when there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based or the undertakings concerned act contrary to their commitments or the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the undertakings concerned.
The terms, conditions and procedure for acceptance of commitments on the part of the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned and matters relating to suspension of the time-limits under Article 15(4) and (5) shall be determined by decision of the Competition Commission, taken in Plenary.
7) The undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned shall be required, within fifteen (15) days from notification of the decision finding the infringement or considering that there is a likelihood of infringement and ordering its ceasing, to inform the President of the Competition Commission regarding the actions they have taken or intend to take to cease the infringement. The same requirement shall apply to undertakings or associations of undertakings as regards compliance with a judgment issued on appeal against a decision of the Competition Commission.
8) A decision of the Competition Commission taken in Plenary shall determine the terms and conditions for exemption from or reduction of fines imposed on undertakings and natural persons who assist the investigation of horizontal restrictive practices under Article 1 or under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (leniency programme). In the event of an undertaking being included in the leniency programme, Article 44(3) and (4) shall apply respectively.
Art. 44. Criminal sanctions and other administrative consequences.
(1) Any person who executes an agreement, takes a decision or applies a concerted practice in breach of Article 1 or Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall be punished by a fine between EUR fifteen thousand (15,000) and one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000). Any person who, in the capacity of Article 25(2)(c), acts in breach of Articles 5 to 10 or fails to apply decisions issued in accordance with Article 11(5) and (6) shall be subject to the same punishment. If the act referred to in the first sentence pertains to undertakings which are in actual or potential competition with each other, a term of imprisonment of at least two (2) years and a fine of between EUR one hundred thousand (100,000) and one million (1,000,000) shall be handed down.
(2) Any person who abuses a dominant market position in breach of Article 2 of the present law or Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall be punished by a fine of between EUR thirty thousand (30,000) and three hundred thousand (300,000).
(3a) Where:
a) an application for leniency is approved, pursuant to article 25(8) providing for total immunity from fine or reduction of fine and full payment thereof, or
b) an application for settlement is approved, pursuant to article 25a providing for full payment of the fine, a waiver from any criminal liability of the first and third subparagraph of paragraph 1 shall be granted as well as from any offences by constructive concurrence. The provision of facilitatory partial payment of the finefacilitates criminal prosecution for as long as the arrangement is in force and the debtor is consistent with its terms. During the period of suspension, the limitation of the offenses shall be suspended without applying the time limitations referred to in Article 113(2) (a) of the Penal Code. Following the admission to the programme of article 25(8), which gave effect to the imposition of a reduced fine, where the fine is not paid in full, it shall constitute a mitigating circumstance in itself for the offences of paragraphs 1 and 2 and a reduced sanction shall be imposed pursuant to article 83 of the Penal Code.
(3b) Where:
a) an application for leniency is approved, pursuant to article 25(8) providing for total immunity from fine or reduction of fine and full payment thereof, or
b) an application for settlement is approved, pursuant to article 25a providing for full payment of the fine, the undertaking concerned and any other person pursuant article 25(2)(c) shall be relieved from any administrative penalty. In the above cases, the finding of the relevant infringement shall not establish grounds for exclusion of the undertaking from public procurement procedures or concessions, except the repetitive breach provided for in article 1 or article 101 TFEU. A repetitive breach shall mean the issuing of a relevant declaratory decision within six (6) years from the earlier issuing of another declaratory decision. The present provision shall apply to the event of facilitated partial fine payment and for as long the arrangement is in force and the debtor is consistent with its terms. The present provision shall also apply where there is a declaratory decision on the infringement of article 1 or article 101 TFEU and a three-year period from its issuing has not yet elapsed.
(4) Persons who commit or are involved in an act in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall go unpunished if they report it of their own volition along with evidence, prior of being examined in connection with their act, to the Public Prosecutor, the Competition Commission or any other competent authority. In any event, the material contribution of the above persons to the discovery of involvement in such practices, by adducing evidence to the authorities, is deemed to be a mitigating circumstance in accordance with Article 84 of the Penal Code and a reduced fine is imposed in accordance with Article 83 of the Penal Code.
(5) If the act referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 is being investigated in any manner by the Competition Commission or any other competent authority, the Public Prosecutor shall stay any further action following the preliminary investigation, pending a decision by the Competition Commission, with the assent of the prosecutor to the Courts of Appeal, in which case the time limit in Article 113(3)(a) of the Penal Code shall not apply.
(6) Any person affected by infringements of paragraphs 1 and 2 may appear as civil plaintiff at trials of such acts.
(7) A punishment of at least six (6) months’ imprisonment is imposed on:
a) Whoever obstructs or hampers, in any manner, investigations carried out under the provisions of the present Law by the competent bodies under Article 39, in particular by posing impediments or concealing evidence.
b) Whoever refuses or prevents provision of information under Article 38.
c) Anyone who knowingly provides with false information or conceals evidence, in breach of Articles 38 and 39.
d) Whoever refuses, after having been duly summoned by an HCC’s official designated under par. 1, 2 & 3 of Article 39, or other body competent for the investigation, to make a sworn or unsworn statement before it, according to the provisions of subparagraph (c) of par. 1 of Article 39, as well as anyone who, during his statement, knowingly provides false information or denies or conceals any facts.